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1 In June 1951, the security service of the German Democratic Republic arrested an East
German citizen. The member of the People’s police had attracted the Stasi’s attention
for several reasons. In private conversations with colleagues the former activist of the
East German socialist youth organization FDJ repeatedly had boasted about his crimes
against Soviet Prisoners of War. In addition, again and again he had swaggered about
his ideas of racial German superiority and advantages of Hitler’s domestic and world
order. Finally, in his private training sessions with an air gun the arrested had used
photographs of Stalin as target. In view of the power relations in the early GDR, the
Stasi had to inform the Soviet State Security, the MGB, about ongoing investigations.
The so‑called Chekists decided to take over the whole case.  In the end, judges of  a
Soviet  military  tribunal  did  not  investigate  possible  war  crimes.  In  contrast,  they
classified the German’s rants against Stalin and Moscow and his target practices as
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anti‑Soviet agitation and terrorism. The prisoner was sentenced to death. In September
1952, he was executed in Moscow, cremated, his ashes were buried in an anonymous
field on the Moscow Donskoe cemetery.
2 This  cruel  detail  reflects  core  aspects  and  spheres  of  the  Soviet  presence  in  East
Germany in the early post‑war period. Besides the importance of the collaboration of
East  German  institutions  and  representatives  with  Soviet  authorities,  the  incident
underlines Soviet readiness to persecute mercilessly political and ideological deviations
among the German population and therefore the significance of repressive instruments
for Soviet rule. Finally, the case demonstrates the almost abnormal relevance of the
Soviet Stalin cult for both Moscow’s definition of loyal supporter or enemies as well as
for the day‑to‑day life and daily political practices in the periphery of Soviet empire. 
3 Research on this latter aspect of the processes of Sovietization in the second of “three
concentric rings of the Soviet imperial unity”1 is a comparatively, but not an entirely
new field.  In  general,  the  author  of  the  given study,  Aleksei  Tikhomirov,  seems to
overrate the impact of the classic—reductionist—models of totalitarianism on already
available analyses of post‑war East Germany and tends to play down existing findings
about  the  complex  interplay  between East  German society  and  rulers.  Besides,  the
dynamic relation interdependency, that existed between Soviet terrorist measures and
symbolic politics and the relative weight of corresponding Soviet (and East German)
deliberations  or  power  practices  remains  unspecified.  In  this  context,  for  instance,
Tikhomirov’s  insightful  discussion  concerning  generation  and  exploitation  of
emotional bonds between rulers and subjects somehow neglects the fact that fear was
supposed to play and indeed played an important role in emergence and consolidation
of Stalinist regimes. Here, for instance, the chronological sequence of extensive purges
and persecutions on one hand and introduction,  widening and consolidation of  the
Stalin cult—and other means of symbolic politics—on the other hand suggests, that the
interrelation of Soviet as well as East German priorities, scopes of action, flexibility or
lack of malleability, and instruments of power might have deserved a denser analysis.
Besides, the ambivalences of Soviet producers of the Stalin cult for and in Germany,
who could serve political as well as individual aims, would additionally differentiate
corresponding  developments.2 In  a  broader  perspective,  it  is  at  least  notable  that
Tikhomirov’s  periodization  of  symbolic  politics  in  East  Germany  corresponds  to
traditional phases which are proposed by political, economic, or international histories.
In  the  long  run,  a  comparative  perspective  on  the  use  of  different  tools  or
preponderance  of  single  methods  in  the  process  of  Sovietization as  well  as  on  the
successive  implementation  of  specific  aspects  of  Soviet  conceptions  and  models
throughout  the  vast  regions  of  Moscow’s  influence  and  interest  might  deepen  our
comprehension of the twisted global process with its national characteristics.3 
4 Such approach would require a coordinated effort by a team of area specialists. It is no
minor achievement, that Tikhomirov’s study may inspire corresponding multifaceted,
necessarily interdisciplinary efforts. Indeed, his differentiated research on the Stalin
cult in East Germany definitely enriches our understanding of principles, mechanisms,
roles, and limits of fundamental cultural dimensions of the Soviet project of imperial
extension.  His  theoretical  conceptualizations  use  a  wide  range  of  impulses  from
historical, sociological, and psychological angles of view. This broad opening of possible
and fruitful perspectives constitutes one of the most valuable parts of the book. On this
basis, the author discusses the role of the Stalin cult in formation and legitimization of
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the post‑war East German satellite. It becomes evident, that the cult was to enable, to
support, and to implement the establishment of Stalinist states and societies in newly
occupied regions. At the same time, the cult cemented an imperial hierarchy, where
Moscow constituted the uncontested center. Incidentally, Tikhomirov’s presumptions
of the relevance of German senses of guilt and loss for the establishment of a socialist
dictatorship in East Germany will provoke further discussions. 
5 In  general,  the  solid  archival  fundament  testifies,  that  Tikhomirov  managed  to
translate  his  ambitious  theoretical  approach  into  a  convincing  research  program,
although  one  does  not  need  complex  constructs  to  explain,  why  East  German
opposition groups preferred to act under favour of night. Besides, it remains to be seen,
whether debates of perceptions of the Stalin cult by the German man in the street win
by the use of regional or local archives. 
6 In  general,  Tikhomirov’s  compact  description  of  the  continuous  broadening  of
principal target audiences within and outside the communist party helps to retrace the
transfer  of  specific  Stalinist  representations  to  East  Germany  as  well  as  their
significance in the complex process of—attempted and often limited—penetration or
transformation of East German structures. In December 1949, in the context of Stalin’s
70th birthday, the remarkable intensification of the Stalin cult mirrored the creation of
the first socialist state in Germany. After Khrushchev’s secret speech in February 1956,
the more or less abrupt end of the Stalin cult in East Germany once again underlined
the ambivalent character of the Soviet‑East German project. The SED leadership was to
follow Moscow’s change of course and adopted the post‑Stalinist practice of official
oblivion, while simultaneously adhering to the new imperial focus on a refreshed Lenin
cult.  Nevertheless,  given  the  multi‑functionality  of  the  Stalin  cult,  the  Soviet
disenchantment of Stalin confronted the SED leadership with several problems. While
many  East  Germans  interpreted  Moscow’s  volte‑face  as  justification  of  their  own
rejection  of  Soviet  influence  and  socialist  rule,  other  felt  betrayed  by  the  new,
unexpected loss of a beloved or respected point of orientation ‑ both perspectives could
not but endanger the stability of East German hierarchies. In these multiple contexts,
Ulbricht had to secure his own personality cult against emerging criticisms, but at the
same time could seize the opportunity of greater latitude to strengthen his position
against factional and public challenges. 
7 In  the  period  between  1949  and  1956,  the  Stalin  cult  fully  developed  its
multidimensional functions and meanings in political‑ideological, economic, social, and
generational  relations  and spheres.  Exemplarily,  Tikhomirov’s  interpretation  of  the
newly designed Stalin Boulevard (Stalinallee) in East Berlin and of Stalinstadt (formerly
Fürstenberg an der Oder) brings together the different possibilities, ideas, aims, and
inconsistencies  of  the  Stalin  cult.  Both  undertakings  underlined  the  East  Germany
loyalty to Moscow and the integration in an anti‑Western camp. They demonstrated
the SED’s ambitions to build new societies with new, socialist human beings. In this
context,  the projects  called for  new endeavours and held the promises of  a  golden
future for loyal socialist citizens—measured by standards of a more or less capitalist
consumerism. 
8 This latter disaccord ties in with the introductory remarks. Obviously, the Stalin cult
could neither eliminate nor completely conceal inherent contradictions of the Soviet
project. The cult was an integral and important part of the post‑war extension of Soviet
power and the  consolidation of  the  SED regime.  At  the  same time,  it  reflected the
Aleksei Tikhomirov, “Luchshii drug nemeckogo naroda”, kul´t Stalina v Vostoch...
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/4 | 2015
3
shortcomings and systemic defaults of  the exported,  partially internalized,  partially
adapted  Stalinist  concepts  and  mechanisms.  From  this  perspective,  the  cultural
Stalinization of East Germany had to work hand in hand with other power instruments
to become effective. After 1956, a ritual de‑Stalinization alone proved to be insufficient
to  establish  an  alternative,  viable  and  widely  accepted  socialist  Republic  in  East
Germany.  It  was  the  Berlin  wall  that  finally  had  to  protect  post‑Stalinist  socialist
leadership cults. The cults themselves were unable to attract, convince, and integrate
the people or to legitimize the post‑Stalinist regime in East Germany.
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